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THE "NEW AND IMPROVED" CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT-CODIFIED
Since Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc.,' the actio de in rem verso or unjust
enrichment claim has surfaced in the reporters.2 Fundamentally, the demand has
its foundation in a civil law notion of equity-that one person should not unfairly
profit at another's detriment. Given the vague parameters of this touchstone of
rough justice, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Edmonston v. A-Second
Mortgage Co.,' established five criteria for a person to pursue the action success-
fully, including the important standard that there is no other remedy available at
law. Thus, for nearly twenty years the courts have spoken with a uniform voice in
describing the unjust enrichment claim as subsidiary in nature and subject to strict
limitations.'
Copyright 1996, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Member, New Orleans, Louisiana State, and American Bar Associations.
** Member, New Orleans, Louisiana State, and American Bar Associations.
1. 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1967). See John A. St. Clair, Actio De In Rem Verso in
Louisiana: Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 43 Tul. L. Rev. 263 (1969).
2. E.g., Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So. 2d 569 (La. 1989);
Kirkpatrick v. Young, 456 So. 2d 622 (La. 1984); Creely v. Leisure Living, Inc., 437 So. 2d 816 (La.
1983); Fogleman v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., 638 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 644
So. 2d 375 (1994); Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 498 So. 2d 753
(1986); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Ins. Cos., 490 So. 2d 565 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Ettinger
v. Greenleaf, 483 So. 2d 1116 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986); Cabral v. CIB Invs., Inc., 433 So. 2d 897
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1983); Succession of Skye, 417 So. 2d 1221 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 422
So. 2d 165 (1982); Johnson v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 416 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982);
Marceaux v. Town of Lake Arthur, 415 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); G. Woodward Jackson
Co. v. Crispens, 414 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
3. 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974). See Albert Tate, Jr., The Louisiana Action for Unjustified
Enrichment, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 883 (1976) [hereinafter Unjustified Enrichment]; Albert Tate, Jr., The
Louisiana Action for Unjustified Enrichment: A Study in Judicial Process, 51 Tul. L. Rev. 446
(1977) [hereinafter Judicial Process]; Stewart M. Thomas, Conditions for the Application of Actio
De In Rem Verso, 36 La. L. Rev. 312 (1975).
4. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Deaton, Inc., 581 So. 2d 714, 717 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
588 So. 2d 1117 (1991) (stating that "the action will only be allowed when there is no other remedy
at law, i.e., the action is subsidiary or corrective in nature") (quoting Minyard, 251 La. at 652, 205
So. 2d at 432); Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., 849 F.2d 179, 184 (5th Cir. 1988) (same); Ettinger,
483 So. 2d at 1119 (same); Roberson Advertising Serv., Inc. v. Winnfield Life Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d
662, 665 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984) (listing as the fifth element "an absence of a remedy at law");
Cabral, 433 So. 2d at 900 (same); G. Woodward Jackson Co., 414 So. 2d at 856 (same); Austin v.
North Am. Forest Prods., 656 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that "the action will only be
allowed when there is no other remedy at law, i.e., the action is subsidiary or corrective in nature")
(quoting Minyard, 251 La. at 652, 205 So. 2d at 432).
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During its regular session in 1995, the Louisiana Legislature on the recommen-
dation of the Louisiana State Law Institute passed Act 1041, originally House Bill
713. Act 1041 amends and reenacts Articles 2292 through 2313 of the Civil Code
of 1870 as revised Articles 2292 through 2305-treating obligations arising without
agreement or sometimes known as quasi-contracts.5 In addition, in Section 1 of
Chapter 2 of Title V of the Revised Civil Code, the legislature codified the unjust
enrichment claim:
A person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of
another person is bound to compensate that person. The term "without
cause" is used in this context to exclude cases in which the enrichment
results from a valid juridical act or the law. The remedy declared here is
subsidiary and shall not be available if the law provides another remedy
for the impoverishment or declares a contrary rule.
The amount of compensation due is measured by the extent to which
one has been enriched or the other has been impoverished, whichever is
less.
The extent of the enrichment or impoverishment is measured as of the
time the suit is brought or, according to the circumstances, as of the time
the judgment is rendered."
This essay explores the actio de in rem verso set forth in the Revised Civil Code in
three ways: its source (and, as a consequence, its limitations); the measure of
recovery; and its invocation in three types of situations.
A. The Source of the Action
The Civil Code of 1870 commenced with a clear declaration of the positive
nature7 of its contents: "Law is a solemn expression of legislative will."' Article
3 of the Civil Code of 1870 identified custom as a secondary source of law.9 To
5. Article 2293 of the Civil Code of 1870 defined quasi-contracts as "the lawful and purely
voluntary act of a man, from which there results any obligation whatever to a third person, and
sometimes a reciprocal obligation between the parties." Two quasi-contracts flow from the
management of another's affairs (the negotiorum gestio) and the payment of a thing not due. La.
Civ. Code arts. 2295, 2301 (1870). Both of these arrangements are included in the revised articles.
La. Civ. Code arts. 2292-2297, 2299-2305.
6. La. Civ. Code art. 2298 (emphasis added).
7. The "characteristic of written law is that it represents with respect to the rule of law it enacts
the authority of a specific social organ, cast in a verbal form which sets its contours and defines its
content binding for all." Francois G6ny, Methode d'Interprdtation et Sources en droit privd Positif,
no. 92, at 165 (La. State L. Inst. trans. 1954).
8. La. Civ. Code art. 1 (1870). Article 2 of the Civil Code continues this concept.
9. In its current form, Article 3 of the Revised Civil Code reads as follows: "Custom results
from practice repeated for a long time and generally accepted as having acquired the force of law.
Custom may not abrogate legislation." See William T. Tete, The Code, Custom and the Courts:
Notes Toward a Louisiana Theory of Precedent, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1973).
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address the "unprovided for case,"'1 Article 21 stated as follows: "In all civil
matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed and decide
according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law
and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent."" Both ordinal and
logical perspectives demonstrate that the redactors of the Civil Code envisioned
judges resorting to custom only when no legislation exists and when the behavior
at issue falls within well-defined guides of societal expectations. One often cited
illustration is a bride assuming her spouse's family name. 2 With even greater
force, the courts should decline any invitation to resort to equity except in rare
instances when no legislation reasonably covers the matter in dispute and when a
judicial failure to act will result in manifest injustice. 3 One commentator offered
the following approach for a court receiving a plea for equity: (1) examine the
statutory law, (2) "'plumb the depths' of the dispositions of written law," (3)
proceed "ex aequo et bono," or according to equity and conscience, and then (4)
"supplement [ ] the law." 4
B. The Elements of the Claim
Against this truncated and simplified backdrop, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana recognized and outlined the actio de in rem verso in its seminal
decisions in Minyard and Edmonston. The language of the Edmonston opinion
is significant in at least three respects. First, it denotes the action as a "remedy
... founded upon principles... in Civil Code articles 21 and 1965... used to
fill a gap in the law .... ,, Second, it admonishes the courts not to turn "to
equity to remedy every unjust displacement of wealth with unregulated
discretion...." 6  Third, it contains the five requirements for a person to
pursue the claim successfully:
1) There must be an enrichment; 2) there must be an impoverishment;
3) there must be a connection between the enrichment and the impover-
ishment; 4) there must be an absence of "justification" or "cause" for
the enrichment and impoverishment; and 5) the action will only be
10. See Mitchell Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role of Article 21, 9 Tul. L. Rev. 485
(1935); Ferdinand F. Stone, The So-Called Unprovided for Case, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 93 (1978).
11. Article 4 of the Civil Code embodies this principle.
12. La. Civ. Code art. 100: "Marriage does not change the name of either spouse. However, a
married person may use the surname of either or both spouses as surname." Revision comment (b)
to Article 100 states: "Under this Article the legal name of each spouse remains unchanged, although
the spouses are entitled to use each other's names as a matter of custom."
13. In short, the "doctrine of unjustified enrichment does not exist for the purpose of remedying
hardships created by the operation of the textual provisions of the Civil Code." H.C. Gutteridge &
R.J.A. David, The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment, 5 Camb. L.J. 204 (1934). See 2 M. Planiol,
Trait6 616mentaire de droit civil, no. 933 (1 1th ed. 1959).
14. Tete, supra note 9, at 5-6.
15. Edmonston, 289 So. 2d at 120.
16. Id. at 120.
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allowed when there is no other remedy at law, i.e., the action is
subsidiary or corrective in nature.
7
Of these elements, the last two-that the enrichment is without cause" and that
the remedy is subsidiary to claims invoking legislation or custom-go to the
heart of the action.
C. "Without Cause" and "Subsidiary "-Separate Criteria or Redundant?
With respect to enrichment "without cause," essentially the question is
whether the enrichment had a legal basis, 9 that is, whether or not a rule of law
or act between the parties supports the plaintiff's transfer of an economic benefit
to the defendant. An enrichment lacks legal justification and, accordingly, is
without cause when it is based "neither [in] contract nor through a positive
provision of the law authorizing the acquisition or protecting it from attack." 20
Should a valid contract exist, then the obligations flowing from it, pursuant
to the parties' mutual intentions and expectations, justify the respective transfers
of economic benefits. Thus, when an individual receives a payment due under
a contract, his enrichment is not unjust. Rather, it is supported by an agreement
that has the force of law between the parties.2' Similarly, should a rule of law
exist to support the transfer, there is no claim of unjust enrichment.
For example, in G. Woodward Jackson Co. v. Crispens,z G. Woodward
Jackson (d/b/a Woodward Jackson Co., Inc.) sued William Crispens and Carl
Fontenot to recover the value of his work on a boiler located upon property owned
by Mr. Fontenot and leased by Mr. Crispens. Mr. Jackson had contracted with Mr.
Crispens and not Mr. Fontenot. Nonetheless, Mr. Jackson alleged that Mr.
Fontenot was unjustly enriched by his work and that, as a result, Mr. Fontenot owed
him the value of his services. The fourth circuit upheld the trial court's dismissal
of the claim, ruling that Mr. Jackson did not show that Mr. Fontenot's enrichment
was unjustified or without cause. A rule of law justified Mr. Fontenot retaining the
benefit of Mr. Jackson's repairs without paying for them. This rule, as expressed
in Articles 2693 and 2694 of the Civil Code, "protects a landlord from having to
reimburse the tenant for repairs to the premises unless the tenant gives sufficient
notice to the landlord of the need for repair and of his intent to have the work
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. "Cause" in this context is different from the cause necessary to bind persons in the setting of
a conventional obligation. See La. Civ. Code art. 1966; Edmonston, 289 So. 2d at 122.
19. "[T]hat there is no 'justification' is inherent in the definition of 'unjust."' Minyard, 251 La.
at 651, 205 So. 2d at 433.
20. Tate, Unjustfied Enrichment, supra note 3, at 887.
21. La. Civ. Code art. 1983: "[C]ontracts have the effect of law for the parties and may be
dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on grounds provided by law. Contracts must be
performed in good faith."
22. 414 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
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performed."'  The court concluded that the legislature intended to protect lessors
(like Mr. Fontenot) from claims by persons (like Mr. Jackson) making repairs to the
leased premises that the lessors did not authorize or approve. Hence, Mr. Jackson's
impoverishment was not without cause.
To satisfy the without cause element of the actio, a plaintiff must show that
there is no authority-by legislation, by conve de in rem versontion, or by
custom-that permits the defendant to retain the benefit he has received. Despite
any broader application that the words "unjust enrichment" may suggest, a claim
does not arise merely because a transfer of a benefit appears unfair or inequitable.
As one commentator has stated,
An enrichment can never be regarded as unjustified if the defendant is
entitled by virtue of some provision of the law either to demand a benefit
or to retain it. The doctrine of unjustified enrichment does not exist for
the purpose of remedying hardships created by the operation of the textual
provisions of the Civil Code.24
Finally, the jurisprudence requires the plaintiff claiming unjust enrichment to
have no alternative remedy available to him. The subsidiary element prevents
persons from pressing the actio de in rem verso when a non-equity/quasi-contract
cause of action exists to remedy the impoverishment. Thus, when a person may
pursue a cause of action in contract or in tort, he may not remedy his injury through
a claim of unjust enrichment.2
The late Justice Tate' and a few other commentators27 have quibbled with
premising the action for unjust enrichment upon Article 21 of the Civil Code of
1870 and challenged the subsidiary color of the claim. The reasons for the
subsidiary condition are sound, however, and they include the following: (1) to
restrict the courts from eroding the principles of positive law; and (2) to promote
the efficient use ofjudicial resources.2 s Justice Tate suggested that the subsidiary
element is actually included within the "without cause" element and, properly
speaking, is not a separate requirement.29 The without cause and the subsidiary
elements, however, are distinguishable.
"Without cause" addresses whether there is a legal justification for the
enrichment. The court will not entertain a claim of unjust enrichment when a legal
rule exists supporting the transfer. The subsidiary element, while somewhat similar
23. Id. at 856 (citing La. Civ. Code arts. 2693-2694).
24. Tate, Unjustified Enrichment, supra note 3, at 888 (citations omitted).
25. Minyard, 251 La. at 652, 205 So. 2d at 433; Edmonston, 289 So. 2d at 122.
26. Tate, Judicial Process, supra note 3, at 458-59.
27. See Tate, Judicial Process, supra note 3, at 457-61; Thomas, supra note 3, at 317. But see
Leon Mazeaud et al., 2 Lecons de droit civil §§ 707-708 (1956); Francois Gord, L'enrichiss ement
aux d6pens d'autrui § 143, at 153 (1949).
28. Barry Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law, 36 Tul. L. Rev.
605, 609, 635 (1962).
29. Tate, Unjustified Enrichment, supra note 3, at 888-89.
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at first blush, properly places the unjust enrichment remedy within the hierarchy of
civilian legal doctrine. When the positive law-the paramount authori-
ty-addresses an issue, a litigant cannot urge unjust enrichment regarding the same
subject-matter as a form of relief either contrary to legislation or custom, as an
alternative to legislation or custom, or in combination with legislation or custom.
One way to view the landscape of the actio de in rem verso is similar to the doctrine
of federal preemption. The laws of the states yield in favor of Congress' mandates
whenever federal legislation reasonably "occupies the field."30 In like manner,
when the positive law addresses an issue but does not provide a justification for an
impoverishment and a corresponding enrichment-providing the genesis for the
transfer of a benefit "without cause"-a claim for unjust enrichment should not lie.
It does not satisfy the subsidiary test. The legislature, in this situation, addressed
this area of law and chose not to authorize a remedy. While a disappointed
person's impoverishment is not affirmativelyjustified by any statute, a tribunal may
(and should) reasonably conclude that a claim for unjust enrichment runs counter
to the whole of the legislative scheme.
Several commentators have fused two notions into the subsidiary element: (1)
a court should reject an unjust enrichment claim when the positive law denies
another action that has its factual grounding in the same circumstances as the
person pursuing the actio de in rem verso has outlined in support of his demand;
and (2) a plaintiff may not urge the action where there is another remedy available
or when he has, by reason of neglect or error, failed to avail himself of a remedy.3
A few illustrations may illuminate the issue.
In Austin v. North American Forest Products,32 the plaintiff ("Jack Austin")
sought recovery for its losses stemming from its use of defective exterior doors
manufactured by North American Forest Products ("North America"). When the
court determined that its potential action in redhibition had prescribed, Jack Austin
made a demand of unjust enrichment, arguing that its claim met the subsidiary
requirement since it had no other remedy.33 The court, in rejecting Jack Austin's
position, held that the existence of the prescribed claim in redhibition prevented any
claim for unjust enrichment.3 Jack Austin could not ignore its legal/contractual
remedy (and allow it to lapse) and then prosecute an action based upon equi-
ty/quasi-contract.
Similarly, in Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., US.A.,35 William Sheets sued
Yamaha Motors Corporation, U.S.A. ("Yamaha"), alleging that it misappropriated
30. E.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991); R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130, 107 S. Ct. 499 (1986).
31. Planiol, supra note 13, at no. 937A; Nicholas, supra note 28, at 635-36. See John P. Dawson,
Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis 106 (1951).
32. 656 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1981).
33. "Austin argues that he is entitled to relief against the manufacturer for unjust enrichment
under the law of Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc." Id. at 1087 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 1088-89.
35. 849 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1988).
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his design modifications to a motorcycle in violation of the Trade Secrets Act of
Louisiana.36 Mr. Sheets, however, had not taken reasonable steps to maintain
the secrecy of his work. As a consequence, the Trade Secrets Act did not
protect his designs. Undeterred, Mr. Sheets argued that Yamaha had enriched
itself unjustly through its alleged misappropriation. The Fifth Circuit upheld the
district court's dismissal of Mr. Sheets' claim:
Louisiana enacted an express statutory scheme to protect individuals and
entities in ... [Mr. Sheets'] position ... when it adopted the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act. Under Louisiana law, . .. [Mr. Sheets] is not
entitled to fall back on the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment ....
Louisiana law makes clear that when an adequate remedy at law is
available, the court may not resort to principles of equity.37
Thus, the subsidiary element of the judicially created unjust enrichment test
contemplates more than barring a litigant from choosing the unjust enrichment
claim from among other potential causes of action. Whenever the legislature
speaks on a subject, whether or not a particular litigant has a viable remedy
under the legislation, the actio de in rem verso is unavailable. A court should
not resort to equity/quasi-contract unless "no rule for a particular situation can
be derived from legislation or custom."3 A claim of unjust enrichment is
"available merely to remedy the otherwise unaddressed."39
The courts' views of the subsidiary element, however, have been less than
uniform. This standard, and its interaction with the requirement of without
cause, has generated a degree of confusion in the reported decisions.'
Fortunately, in step with Edmonston and its progeny, via Act 1041 of 1995, the
legislature has incorporated the criteria developed and accepted in the jurispru-
dence over the past two decades. Significantly, revised Article 2298 includes the
specific notation that the actio de in rem verso is subsidiary in nature.
Originally, comment (c) to revised Article 2298 read, in part, as follows: "Under
Article 2298 ... recovery for 'enrichment without cause' is no longer a
subsidiary remedy."'4' That is incorrect and readers should disregard it.42
Also, the comment now is consistent with the text.
36. La. R.S. 51:1431-1439 (1987 and Supp. 1996).
37. 849 F.2d at 184.
38. La. Civ. Code art. 4.
39. Bruce V. Schewe & Kent A. Lambert, Recent Developments in the Law, 1993-1994--Obliga-
tions, 55 La. L. Rev. 597, 600 (1995).
40. E.g., Roberson Advertising Serv., Inc. v. Winnfield Life Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 662 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1984). See Tate, Unjustified Enrichment, supra note 3, at 889-90 (citations omitted).
41. La. Civ. Code art. 2298, cmt. c. (West's Louisiana Session Law Service 1995, No. 5).
42. Section 4 of Act 1041 notes that the "comments... are not part of the law." See Ramirez
v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So. 2d 811, 813 (La. 1991) (comments have "no... effect... because
they are not part of the law").
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D. The Calculation of the Recovery
The second and third paragraphs of revised Article 2298 state that a person
successfully pursuing a claim of unjust enrichment recovers the lesser of the
impoverishment or the enrichment "measured as of the time the suit is brought
or, according to the circumstances, as of the time the judgment is rendered."
This time measurement for deciding on the amount of recovery in an unjust
enrichment case is somewhat unusual.
As a part of the omnibus revamp of the law of obligations in 1984, 4' the
legislature pronounced that "[o]bligations ... arise directly from the law,
regardless of a declaration of will, in instances such as wrongful acts, the
management of the affairs of another, unjust enrichment and other facts." The
jurisprudence has settled the question when the obligation to repair dictated by
Article 2315 of the Civil Code (arising from an offense or quasi-offense) comes
into existence: when the tortfeasor causes the harm.45 Similarly, the obligation
due by a person unfairly enriched to a person unjustly impoverished arises
independent of the impoverished person instituting a lawsuit. Logic suggests that
the person successfully prosecuting the actio de in rem verso should receive
compensation centered on the date when the obligation came into being, plus
interest until satisfied."
However, the redactors of revised Article 2298 did not adopt this approach.
Perhaps, the legislature intended to align the unjustly impoverished person's
recovery to that of a plaintiff in a tort action-with interest commencing from
the time of judicial demand.47 To soften the sometimes harsh result of this rule,
particularly in cases when the defendant in an unjust enrichment suit legitimately
(albeit unsuccessfully) contests the plaintiff's entitlement to recover anything, the
court may fashion a purely prospective remedy-with its effect dating from the
time of the judgment-thereby relieving the defendant of the pendente lite
interest. 48
43. 1984 La. Acts No. 331 (effective Jan. 1, 1985).
44. La. Civ. Code art. 1757.
45. E.g., Thomassie v. Savoie, 581 So. 2d 1031, 1306 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 589 So.
2d 493 (1991) ('[T]he debt owed by a tort-feasor to the victim... accrues at the time the injury is
sustained, and not on the date that suit is filed or judgment obtained.'); LeBlanc v. American
Employers Ins., 364 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), writ denied, 366 So. 2d 916 (1979); Holland
v. Gross, 195 So. 828 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
46. La. Civ. Code art. 2000. See Bruce V. Schewe, On Obligations to Pay Money with a View
Toward Stipulated Remedies and Usury, 44 La. L. Rev. 151 (1983).
47. La. R.S. 13:4203 (1991).
48. The calculation of interest from the date of judicial demand may result in a harsher than
appropriate burden on litigants defending against the unjust enrichment claim. Perhaps the legislature
has reserved the interest incentive to settle for tort cases. In those suits, the theory supporting the
claim, the idea that the defendant injured another by his fault, supports the idea of interest accruing
from the judicial demand.
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E. Placing the Action in Perspective
Three decisions may assist in charting the parameters of and the potential
problems with the actio de in rem verso. These cases illustrate how the courts
in Louisiana have sought to reconcile the more technical requirements of the
claim/remedy with the broad equitable concept of unjust enrichment.
1. There Is No Claim of Unjust Enrichment when Relief Is Contrary to
the Thrust of Positive Law, Custom, or Contract
Charrier v. Belt 9 highlights the limitation of the actio de in rem verso
when it runs counter to legislation, particularly imperative law.50 Leonard
Charrier excavated and obtained possession of almost two and one-half tons of
Tunica Indian artifacts from a burial ground located near the Louisiana State
Penitentiary at Angola. Mr. Charrier admitted that he entered the site and
conducted his work without anyone's permission. Eventually, while engaged in
an effort to sell the artifacts, Mr. Charrier filed a suit seeking a judicial
declaration that he owned the artifacts. The first circuit upheld the trial court's
conclusions that Mr. Charrier did not own the items and that they were the
property of the Tunica Indian Tribe.5
In an attempt to recover compensation for his time and expenses in
excavating the artifacts, Mr. Charrier argued that the Tunica Indians were
unjustly enriched to his detriment.52 The court questioned whether the Tunica
Indian Tribe had received an enrichment because, although it had the proceeds
from the sale of the artifacts, Mr. Charrier's activities had caused "substantial
upset over the ruin of 'ancestral burial grounds.' ' 53 Moreover, Mr. Charrier
could not establish that he was impoverished since he undertook his work with
the knowledge that he did not have permission from anyone (including the
owners of the property) to make his explorations. The element of impoverish-
ment is not present when the person seeking a remedy has "helped another
through his own negligence or fault or through action taken at his own risk."'
49. 496 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
50. Professor Garro has offered the following summary regarding suppletive and imperative
legislation:
Roman legal literature distinguished between roles ofjus cogens, which could not be
derogated from by the parties, and just dispositivum, which could be set aside by contrary
agreement.... Hence, all that the law does not command nor prohibit is abandoned to
the free will of the parties and is permitted.
Alejandro M. Garro, Codification Technique and The Problem of Imperative and Suppletive Laws,
41 La. L. Rev. 1007, 1007 (1981). See La. Civ. Code art. 7.
51. 496 So. 2d at 605-06.
52. Id. at 606. Mr. Charrier urged that "he [was] entitled to recover a sum of money to
compensate his services and expenses on the basis of an actio de in rem verso." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 607.
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Also, the court addressed whether Mr. Charrier's alleged impoverishment was
justified. The Tunica Indian Tribe had a right to prevent the "disinterment of their
deceased relatives ' s5  and a right to damages for the desecration of the graves.
5 6
As a consequence, that "right would be abrogated if descendants were obliged to
reimburse for the expense of the excavation."57 There was, accordingly, "legal
justification for any enrichment received by the Tribe."58
Although Mr. Charrier conducted the operations which recovered the artifacts,
he failed in his demand for compensation. The court properly noted the paramount
interest of imperative legislation and that any award in Mr. Charrier's favor would
turn these statutes on their heads. Since Mr. Charrier's allegation of impoverish-
ment was contrary to the positive law, he could not press the actio de in rem verso
regardless of his ostensible entitlement under the other elements of the claims or the
apparent unfairness of his uncompensated work. 9
2. There is No Claim for Unjust Enrichment when the Positive Law
Reasonably Addresses the Situation
Orleans Onyx, Inc. v. Buchananse concerned the furnishing and installing by
Orleans Onyx, Inc. ("Orleans Onyx") of certain products in a bathroom of a house
owned by Edward Brennan. Orleans Onyx did not contract with Mr. Brennan.
Instead, it had dealt with Charles Buchanan who, at the time, anticipated purchasing
the property. That sale fell through, and Mr. Buchanan did not pay Orleans Onyx
for all of its work or supplies. Orleans Onyx filed a lien against the property under
the Private Works Act6' and, thereafter, sued Mr. Brennan to collect the balance
due under its contract with Mr. Buchanan. The fifth circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Orleans Onyx's action under the Private Works Act.62 The
court, however, looked favorably upon Orleans Onyx's alternative argument that
it should prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment.63 The court noted that Orleans
Onyx's materials and services improved Mr. Brennan's property for which Orleans
Onyx had not received full compensation. The court also recognized the lack of
privity of contract between Mr. Brennan and Orleans Onyx. Because Orleans Onyx
had no recourse under the Private Works Act, there was "an absence ofjustification
and [Orleans Onyx] ha[d] no other remedy at law.""
55. Id.
56. La. R.S. 8:653-654 (1986); La. R.S. 14:101 (1986).
57. 496 So. 2d at 607.
58. Id.
59. In short, Mr. Charrier's impoverishment was a self-inflicted and illegal wound.
60. 428 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
61. La. R.S. 9:4801-4842 (1991 and Supp. 1996).
62. 428 So. 2d at 844. The court stated that, in the light of the lack of privity between Orleans
Onyx and Mr. Brennan, the Private Works Act does not "provide[] a basis for enforcement of the
lien .... " Id.
63. Id. at 845.
64. Id.
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The fifth circuit turned to the doctrine of unjust enrichment to correct what
it perceived as a manifestly unfair situation. In doing so, however, the court
overlooked a legal remedy available to Orleans Onyx. Article 496 of the Civil
Codes addresses the ownership of improvements to immovables, or component
parts, and the concomitant duties and liabilities. When a good faith possessor
of an immovable makes an improvement upon the property, the owner of the
immovable must keep the improvement and pay the possessor the cost of the
improvement, the current value of the improvement, or the enhanced value of the
immovable." Mr. Brennan had full knowledge that Orleans Onyx was making
improvements to his property under a contract with his prospective buyer (Mr.
Buchanan). Mr. Brennan had permitted Mr. Buchanan to have access to the
property specifically so that he could contract for the improvements made by
Orleans Onyx. Thus, the unjust enrichment claim was not the only remedy open
to Orleans Onyx. The legislature had addressed the issue of the ownership of
improvements to immovables and the attendant liability of the owner. The court
should have resolved the dispute by interpreting Article 496 of the Civil Code
to afford Orleans Onyx relief. This is different than the court concluding that
Orleans Onyx's impoverishment was without cause. Orleans Onyx made a
transfer to Mr. Brennan as a consequence of its valid contract with Mr.
Buchanan. Yet, the positive law required Mr. Brennan to compensate Orleans
Onyx. The decision serves as a caution to remind the courts that, before
invoking the principle of unjust enrichment in confronting what they perceive as
unjust circumstances, they should exhaust the positive law.
3. The Actio De In Rem Verso Fits Well into Contractual Error
Scenarios and Should Replace the Doctrine of Quantum Meruit
In contrast, the supreme court's decision in Morphy, Makofsky & Masson,
Inc. v. Canal Place 200067 presents a clearer picture of what should be the
subsidiary nature of the actio de in rem verso. Morphy, Makofsky & Masson,
Inc. ("MMM") was a sub-subcontractor that performed engineering services for
a sub-contractor of Canal Place 2000, CBM Engineers, Inc. ("CBM"). CBM
requested MMM's services, but CBM and MMM never came to an agreement
about the amount or method of payment."
65. La. Civ. Code art. 496:
[When construction, plantings, or works are made by a possessor in good faith, the owner
of the immovable may not demand their demolition and removal. He is bound to keep
them and at his option pay to the possessor either the cost of the materials and of the
workmanship, or their current value, or the enhanced value of the immovable.
66. La. Civ. Code art. 496. Article 466 defines "things permanently attached to a building" as
component parts.
67. 538 So. 2d 569 (La. 1989).
68. Id. at 572-73.
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MMM sued CBM, seeking remuneration for its engineering services. The trial
court, upon finding that MMM and CBM did not perfect their agreement,
concluded that an equitable award "under quasi-contract or de in rem verso, an
action in unjust enrichment"" was in order. On appeal, the fourth circuit affirmed
the trial court's judgment and relied upon the unjust enrichment theory."0 The
Supreme Court of Louisiana granted MMM's request for a writ of certiorari.
The court concluded that MMM and CBM had entered into a valid oral
agreement under Article 1779 of the Civil Code of 1870.71 Additionally, the court
commented that "at the very least an implied in fact contract existed between the
parties" which has the same effect as a formal agreement.72 Despite MMM and
CBM not agreeing on a price for MMM's services, "the law in this situation implies
a provision that ... [MMM] would be paid a reasonable sum." 3 In assessing
what was a "reasonable sum," the court rejected the use of the impoverish-
ment/enrichment analysis of the actio de in rem verso, noting that a claim for unjust
enrichment was unavailable to MMM "because there exists ... an independent
remedy at law, that is, in contract."'74
The court's reluctance to turn to the actio de in rem verso is puzzling. Rather
than stretch or rewrite the positive law concerning the letting out of services,"S or
invoke the rules of obligations when the more specific legislation relative to leases
should govern,76 the court may have used the unjust enrichment doctrine to
fashion a remedy for MMM.
69. 1d. at 571.
70. 522 So. 2d 1223, 1226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (citing Fullerton v. Scarecrow Club, Inc., 440
So. 2d 945 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Jones v. City of Lake Charles, 295 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974)).
71. Article 1779 set out four requisites: "1. Parties legally capable of contracting. 2. Their
consent legally given. 3. A certain object, which forms the matter of agreement. 4. A lawful
purpose.
72. 538 So. 2d at 573.
73. Id. at 574. Benglis Sash & Door Co. v. Leonards, 387 So. 2d 1171, 1172-73 (La. 1980),
evidences a similar judicial leap:
[Ijt is not essential that the specific sum of the sales price be stated at the time of
contracting. The parties can agree that the price may be ascertained by computation or
that the price may be fixed by arbitration. Or the parties can consent to buy and to sell
a certain thing for a reasonable price, and when they do, the contract of sale has been
perfected. The essential thing is that there be a meeting of the minds ... as to price.
This type of judicial deconstruction of statutes is suspect. "When the Legislature has set forth the
fundamental elements of the contracts of sale and lease--and has included price in each-it is
troubling for the bench, in an effort to achieve an ostensibly fair result in an isolated lawsuit, to rule
that price is not truly a necessary ingredient of the consent of the parties." Bruce V. Schewe, Recent
Developments in the Law, 1988-1989-Obligations, 50 La. L. Rev. 321, 327 (1989).
74. 538 So. 2d at 574-75.
75. Article 2756 of the Civil Code clearly requires a price: "To build by a plot, or to work by
the job, is to undertake a building or a work for a certain stipulated price." See La. Civ. Code arts.
2670, 2671 & 2675.
76. Article 2668 of the Civil Code admonishes the reader to employ the provisions Title IX-of
lease--in preference to the general articles of obligations.
OBLIGATIONS
This case dramatizes one setting in which the actio de in rem verso is
proper: when an action on a contract is not available because persons to the
putative agreement did not comply with the imperative positive law.'
Professor Nicholas has listed a number of illustrations in this category including
the following: "an agent exceed[ing] his authority and thereby confer[ing] a
benefit on the principal; or a builder perform[ing] work for a municipality in
execution of an agreement which was made in good faith but which was void for
noncompliance with certain requirements imposed by statute on contracts with
public authorities.""8  Since the parties did not, by definition, perfect their
agreement-but they acted as if they had-there is neither a cause for the
transfer (enrichment/impoverishment) of things/services from one to the other nor
a redress for the situation. Often the courts resolve these difficulties through the
doctrine of quantum meruit.7 The unjust enrichment remedy, however, seems
more appropriate for at least two reasons: its tradition is more compatible with
the civilian foundation in Louisiana; 0 and, more importantly, it is now a matter
of the positive law.8'
In this context, good faith in the contractual error seems to be a sub-element
of the unjust enrichment claim.82 One purpose of the legislative requirements
for the formation of contracts is to encourage persons to meet those standards.
Should one or both of the parties to an unenforceable "agreement" err in good
faith, however, the principle of unjust enrichment demands that the party
receiving the benefits of the failed bargain may not "deny any payment at all."8 3
F. Conclusion
The actio de in rem verso is an effective tool that allows the courts to
compensate particular persons in particular circumstances to avoid manifest
injustice when the primary sources of law do not reasonably control. The action,
however, is not a general charge for the courts to dispense equity as they see fit.
77. E.g., State v. City of Pineville, 403 So. 2d 49 (1981); Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So. 2d
444 (1975); Sylvester v. Town of Ville Platte, 218 La. 419, 49 So. 2d 746 (1950); Smith v. Town
of Vinton, 216 La. 9, 43 So. 2d 18 (1949); Boxwell v. Department of Highways, 203 La. 760, 14
So. 2d 627 (1943); North Dev. Co. v. McClure, 276 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
78. Barry Nicholas, The Louisiana Law of Unjustified Enrichment Through the Act of the Person
Enriched, 6/7 Tul. Civ. L.F. 3, 20 (1991-92).
79. E.g., Coleman, 305 So. 2d at 444; Corbello v. Jefferson Davis Parish Police Jury, 262 So. 2d
151 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Pugh v. Town of Logansport, 235 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
See Suzanne A. Burke, Quantum Meruit in Louisiana, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 631 (1976).
80. Suzanne Burke has characterized the claim as an "alien action," Burke, supra note 79, at 654,
imported from the common law really without rhyme or reason.
81. The proposition is self-evident that the legislature's enactment of revised Article 2298 should
preempt and suppress a judicially created form of relief that attempts to address the same subject-
matter of problems.
82. Nicholas, supra note 78, at 22. See Vernon V. Palmer, Contractual Negligence in the Civil
Law---The Evolution of a Defense to Actions for Error, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 40-46 (1975).
83. Coleman, 305 So. 2d at 446.
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In order to prevent any "fraud on the law"" and to curb any tendency for
equity to swallow the general rules of the Civil Code, not to mention the
contractual terms of bargains governed by the law of Louisiana, the courts should
remain cognizant of the specialized requirements to the claim. Those specialized
requirements are detailed in revised Article 2298 of the Civil Code.
84. Minyard, 251 La. at 651, 205 So. 2d at 433.
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